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Due to the increasing digitalization of our society, 
IT security professionals must implement even more 
effective security measures to meet the growing 
information security requirements of their 
organizations. To target and effectively deploy these 
measures in the best possible way, they must consider 
different types of behaviors that might lead to 
information security threats. Regarding this issue, 
current research offers little for clarity to security 
professionals when it comes to understanding and 
differentiating the various types of behavior. 
Therefore, this research aims to develop a taxonomy 
to classify different types of information security 
policy non-compliance behavior. Our results present 
a taxonomy with five dimensions, each containing 
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive 
characteristics. Our results provide a basis for a more 
specific analysis of different types of information 
security policy non-compliance behavior and can be 
used for more comprehensive development and 




Over the last two decades, ensuring information 
security has become one of the most important tasks in 
organizations [1]. However, accomplishing this task is 
rather challenging. Research and practice agree that to 
achieve a high level of information security within an 
organization, it is crucial to implement technical 
measures and some appropriate methods to prevent 
non-compliant behavior of employees regarding 
information security policies (ISP) [2]. ISPs can be 
described as "a set of formalized procedures, policies, 
roles and responsibilities that employees must follow 
in order to protect and properly use their 
organizations’ information and technology resources” 
and are used to derive security measures for different 
types of security threats [3]. On the one hand, an 
information security expert is faced with the challenge 
that there are many different types of non-compliant 
behaviors. Keeping them straight is a prerequisite to 
selecting appropriately effective measures that 
positively influence employee’s ISP non-compliance 
behavior [4]. On the other hand, the information 
security researcher is faced with the complex task of 
characterizing and purposefully structuring these 
various types of ISP non-compliance behavior to 
develop security measures against it [5]. 
Considering the fact that employees’ non-
compliant behavior is one of the leading causes of 
security breaches in an organization [6], it is 
mandatory to have a closer examination of the variety 
of types of ISP non-compliant behaviors to understand 
better the different aspects which lead to a certain 
information security threat [1]. However, current 
research about ISP non-compliance behavior uses the 
construct of ISP non-compliance behavior in various 
ways. While some approaches by, e.g., Lembke et al. 
(2018), focus on behavior in a specific context (e.g., 
information distribution between organizations), other 
research approaches aim to provide unified models to 
explain ISP compliance behavior [6, 7]. Nonetheless, 
the usage of context-specific or generalized results 
becomes complicated when the underlying contexts of 
non-compliance behavior change. For example, the 
findings of Trang and Brendel (2019) illustrate that 
theoretical constructs (e.g., sanctions) can have 
different effects, depending on a certain type of 
behavior, such as maliciousness or non-maliciousness 
[8]. Aurigemma and Mattson (2019) show that there is 
substantial behavioral variability in ISP mandated 
actions and that a distinction between different types 
of ISP-related behaviors is important since the 
effectiveness of theoretical constructs differs in terms 





of its measurement [9]. This discussion underlines that 
the different types of behavior need to be defined and 
systematized [10]. 
One possible way to define this variety of types of 
ISP non-compliant behavior is to use a taxonomy. 
Taxonomies are implemented in various research 
areas to reduce complexity by identifying and 
abstractly representing the commonalities and 
differences among objects of interest within the 
domain [11]. The organization of objects into different 
dimensions and characteristics can help create 
structure in a complex subject area and is also seen, 
among other things, as a form of theory building or 
basic design principle that can serve as a foundation 
for further research [12]. As we will show in the course 
of this paper, classification of security threats exists in 
research, although little has been done to define 
different dimensions and characteristics for types of 
ISP non-compliant behavior. While there are 
approaches to describe various factors of non-
compliant behavior, these do not meet the definition of 
taxonomy and can only be used to a limited extent as 
a theory- or design basis in our research area [13]. 
Accordingly, this paper applies a conceptual and 
empirically driven taxonomy development, as 
Nickerson et al. (2013) suggested. 
Drawing on existing research, we first develop a 
conceptual approach for our taxonomy, followed by 
interviews with employees from different 
organizations to extend the taxonomy. The interviews 
were evaluated using structured content analysis [14]. 
Our taxonomy is designed to help information security 
researchers to identify the different types of ISP non-
compliant behavior for other behavior-specific 
research. Information security practitioners can use 
our taxonomy to distinguish better the different 
reasons for a security threat and develop measures that 
effectively address the actual reason and not just the 
non-compliant behavior. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: after 
the introduction, the construct of taxonomies is 
described together with an overview of information 
security policy compliance behavior. Next, the method 
and procedure for taxonomy development, including 
the method for our data collection and analysis, are 
presented. Afterward, we explain how the taxonomy 
was created and discuss our outcome. The paper 
concludes with implications for research and practice, 
as well as limitations of the paper and actions for 
future research. 
2. Background 
2.1. Information security policy compliance 
behavior 
Recently, there has been a growing stream of 
research on the human perspective of information 
security, which focuses on the different types of 
employee’ behavior regarding the ISPs of their 
organization. The focus of this research stream is 
predominantly on identifying theoretical mechanisms, 
which help achieve ISP compliance behavior. Existing 
research shows that different factors contribute to the 
compliance behavior of employees, such as sanctions 
or rewards, or that social factors can have an influence 
on ISP compliance behavior [6]. It also shows that 
contextual differences are important in the use of these 
factors [9]. For example, research indicates that the 
effectiveness of several mechanisms that positively 
influence ISP compliance behavior are culturally 
dependent [15]. For example, the current state of 
research indicates that sanctions are more effective for 
malicious ISP violations [16]. Venkatraman et al. 
(2018) also show that different types of offenses can 
have a smaller or bigger impact on an organization 
[13]. Therefore, we follow previous research findings 
and their conclusions that a precise understanding and 
separable distinction of behaviors (which, e.g., drive 
employees to adhere to roles and responsibilities 
defined in ISPs) play a central role in developing 
effective security measures. 
Considering existing research results on how 
information security behavior can be described and 
distinguished in classification schemes, such as a 
taxonomy, several approaches can be identified. 
Venkatraman et al. (2018), e.g., show that a schematic 
distinction of cyber deviance is important to define 
effective security measures. However, in their 
empirically developed typology, they focus firstly on 
descriptive factors of behavior, secondly, more on 
characteristics that constitute ISP offenses in an 
organization, and thirdly, what behavior has led to 
these different offenses. They list dimensions such as: 
which technical skills are needed, the target group (an 
individual or the organization), the impact of the 
offense (minor or major), and list different behaviors 
as typical examples for these types of security threats. 
They focus less on the nature and different 
components of the behavior itself, ultimately 
becoming an ISP offense [13]. 
Padayachee (2012) developed a taxonomy for 
compliant information security behavior related to the 
motivation factor. Based on the self-determination 
theory, the three factors of intrinsic, extrinsic, or 
amotivation are presented as decisive motivating 
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factors for compliance behavior in a hierarchical 
taxonomy. We suggest taking a closer look at those 
three factors. Intrinsic motivation refers to performing 
an activity because it is inherently interesting, while 
extrinsic motivation means performing an activity 
because it could lead to an expected outcome [4]. 
Amotivation is defined as a ‘state of lacking an 
intention to act and not feeling competent enough to 
perform a certain activity [17]. 
Das et al. (2019) specify these motivational 
factors and argue that there are different types of 
triggers for information security non-compliance 
behavior. They distinguish between self-motivation, 
which relates to intrinsic motivation, and forced or 
social triggers, which refer to extrinsic motivation. A 
forced motivational trigger describes an influencing 
factor, which is not caused by an external source 
around an employee, while a social trigger suggests a 
source located in an employee’s social environment, 
e.g., their team or close friends [17, 18]. 
Ahmad et al. (2016) distinguish between two 
dimensions in their typology for employees’ 
information security behavior. Their typology 
indicates that information security behavior differs 
with respect to whether an employee is aware of the 
non-compliance of their behavior or not [19]. Guo et 
al. (2011) also distinguish between different 
behavioral concepts and state that behavior can be 
malicious or non-malicious [20]. They describe 
malicious behavior as an attitude intending to harm 
another person or their organization with a particular 
act. Non-malicious behavior refers to behavior that is 
intended to help oneself, e.g., by saving time and 
effort, without directly harming another person or the 
organization [20]. Vance et al. (2020) closely relate 
moral belief to behavioral intention and argue that 
individuals can have various moral beliefs, which 
influence the way they behave. Moral beliefs are the 
subjective opinions of what employees regard as 
morally right or wrong and are mostly based on ethics, 
religion, cultural differences or the social environment 
[21]. 
Overall, different elements can be identified in 
existing research that describes types of ISP non-
compliance behavior, such as awareness, different 
motives, or moral beliefs [4, 19, 20]. However, 
existing research currently does not fulfill the need for 
a holistic approach to differentiate between different 
types of ISP non-compliance behavior systematically. 
When considering the importance of contextual 
relevance in ISPCB research, it is necessary to gain an 
overview to understand better which specific types of 
behavior can be influenced by which types of 
theoretical models [9]. Therefore, we conceptually and 
empirically developed a taxonomy to fulfill this need 
and form a theoretical basis for more specific ISP 
compliance behavior research [11]. 
2.2. Taxonomies in research 
 In existing research, the use of taxonomies 
various objectives and under different premises can be 
identified. Before the actual development of the 
taxonomy, we need to present what exactly a 
taxonomy is. A taxonomy is often described as a tool 
for classifying objects and information to illustrate 
complex fields of interest [22]. Thus, it is a useful 
method to explore a less-analyzed or very 
heterogeneous area, where many different research 
approaches with different focuses exist. Besides the 
numerous uses of taxonomies in other fields, such as 
biology [23], there is a lack of usage of this 
methodology in information systems research. Thus, 
Gregor (2006) notes that there is a need for the 
development of typologies (definition often used 
synonymously with a taxonomy) to structure 
constructs and relationships of complex research 
strands and thereby provide a solid foundation for 
further study [11, 12]. From the practical environment 
or the research field, this enables their viewers to gain 
an appropriate overview of a particular subject [24, 25. 
In IS research, and in research in other domains, there 
are different approaches to the development of 
taxonomies [13]. In addition to taxonomy 
development using ad hoc methods, some methods 
perform an empirical derivation of a taxonomy or 
methods with a predominantly conceptual or mixed 
approach [23]. 
We use the definition of a taxonomy given by 
Nickerson et al. (2013) since their definition finds 
application in various research areas, including IS 
research. A taxonomy can be described as a set of 
dimensions, where each dimension consists of 
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive 
characteristics. The characteristics form a particular 
expression of the respective feature (dimension) [11]. 
The respective characteristics must not occur twice or 
interfere with each other. Likewise, each dimension 
must contain at least one characteristic so that the 
taxonomy is descriptive and there are sufficiently 
enough details of the analyzed objects. A taxonomy 
based on these criteria is called a flat taxonomy, where 
there are usually no dependencies between the 
expressions of characteristics of different dimensions 
at a categorized object. Hierarchical taxonomies are 
classification schemes in which characteristics of a 
dimension are themselves a dimension for other 
characteristics. However, a facet taxonomy allows a 
characteristic to be assigned to multiple dimensions, 
which allows the classification to be ordered in 
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multiple ways rather than in a single, predetermined 
constellation of dimensions and characteristics (as in a 
flat or hierarchical taxonomy) [26]. Facet taxonomies 
are often used to create, e.g., system architectures and 
are rather unsuitable for our objective of the structured 
classification of objects [27]. This research focuses on 
the creation of a flat taxonomy. The methodology for 
its creation was adapted from Nickerson et al. (2013) 
[11]. 
3. Methodological approach for taxonomy 
development  
We used a multistep, iterative method based on 
Nickerson et al. (2013) to create our taxonomy for 
information ISP non-compliance behavior [11]. This 
approach was applied because this method focuses on 
(but is not limited to) the development of taxonomies 
in the IS domain and better organizes our results in the 
research stream [25]. In addition, this methodology 
provides a clear framework (meta-characteristic) for 
taxonomy development, to which all inferred 
dimensions and characteristics relate, making the 
taxonomy more focused. Apart from that, the 
methodology defines subjective and objective end 
conditions as measures to progressively finalize an 
iterative taxonomy development in empirical and/or 
conceptual steps. Moreover, detailed steps are 
introduced to ensure that all features in the dimension 
are mutually exclusive and that there are no 
duplications or ambiguities. The approach thus 
combines advantages from purely empirical and 
purely conceptual approaches to taxonomy 
development [11]. 
According to Nickerson et al. (2013), a taxonomy 
must fulfill five criteria to ensure high usability and 
quality. First, the number of dimensions and 
characteristics should be limited in order to make a 
concise possible use of the taxonomy. Second, there 
should be enough dimensions and characteristics to be 
clearly distinguished from one another and thus lead 
to a robust taxonomy. Third, the completeness of the 
taxonomy means that a taxonomy with its dimensions 
can describe all considered objects, whether they 
predefined from an empirical or conceptual approach. 
Fourth, a taxonomy should be extendable by 
dimensions and characteristics, whereas it becomes 
necessary to consider new objects, and fifth, a 
taxonomy should be descriptive [11]. 
Our used methodical approach for taxonomy 
development is shown in Figure 1 and can be 
described as followed. As an initial step, the meta-
characteristic, which reflects the most general 
characteristic of the taxonomy from which all other 
characteristics follow, should be determined. The user 
group of the taxonomy should be considered when 
determining the meta- characteristic, as they have an 
impact on the content of the taxonomy. This process 
can be done explicitly, based on derivations from the 
users, or implicitly, based on the researcher's 
assumptions [28]. The meta-characteristic for this 
article can be defined as determining elements 
describing different types of ISP non-compliance 
behavior in a professional context. Information 
security researchers can use our results to understand 
the phenomenon of ISP non-compliance behavior with 
different degrees of orientation and organization and 
apply the taxonomy as a theoretical basis for more 
specific research, such as a specific type of behavior. 
Professionals can use our taxonomy to develop 
targeted measures for different behaviors to ensure 
information security in their organization. As a 
subsequent step in taxonomy development, the ending 
conditions need to be defined, in which case the 
iterative development of the taxonomy will be 
terminated, and the taxonomy will be considered 
complete. These criteria can be both objective and 
subjective. Subjective ending conditions are reflected 
in the mentioned quality criteria above. Objective 
ending conditions can be defined according to the 
approach and needs of the respective user. We adapted 
the ending conditions of Sowa and Zachman (1992) 
[29]. In the subsequent steps of the approach, users of 
the method can choose again between either a 




Figure 1. Process of taxonomy development [11]. 
 
Each iteration must be defined in advance 
whether one of the two approaches is to be chosen. In 
the deductive approach, the dimensions and 
characteristics of the taxonomy are defined and 
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arranged firstly based on existing literature. 
Proceeding from this, the objects to be considered are 
then assigned to the characteristics of the dimensions. 
The empirical, inductive approach conversely 
proceeds vice versa. In the first place, the objects to be 
analyzed are considered, and new dimensions and 
characteristics are formed and organized based on the 
results of their analysis. After each iteration, it is 
verified whether the previously selected final 
conditions are fulfilled. If this is not the case, a further 
iteration is carried out until the final conditions are 
fulfilled. If the existing taxonomy fulfills all defined 
ending conditions, the taxonomy is considered 
complete, and the development process ends [11, 23]. 
4. Results 
4.1. Taxonomy development process and 
descriptive statistics 
The process for developing the taxonomy in this 
study is illustrated in figure 2. In total, we conducted 
three iterations in which we developed the taxonomy 
using both conceptual and empirical approaches. 
 
 
Figure 2. The number of iterations for the taxonomy 
development. 
 
Our first iteration followed a conceptual-to-
empirical approach. We analyzed existing literature 
describing elements that could be used to classify ISP 
non-compliance behavior. We apply constructs of 
existing research to define our first set of dimensions 
and characteristics. The second iteration is based on an 
empirical-to-conceptual approach. We conducted 58 
interviews with professionals working in an 
organization with information security policies. Our 
interview partners were asked to explain different 
situations in which they felt to behave non-compliant 
or where they might have observed information 
security non-compliance behavior of other employees 
in their organization. Our method was a semi-
structured interview approach. The interviews were 
recorded and documented. The conducted data were 
analyzed using a structured content analysis approach 
based on Mayring (2010) [14]. The descriptive 
statistics for our data sample are shown in Table 1. The 
average age of our subjects was 31 years old. 60% of 
the subjects were male, and 40% were female. The 
majority of subjects work in large corporations with 
more than 10000 employees (57%), 26% work in 
medium-sized companies (>250-9999 employees), 
and 17% work in small companies with fewer than 250 
employees. The departments represented vary. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the conducted interviews. 
 
Department Amount Industry Amount 
IT 16% Manufacturing 38% 
Sales 16% Biotechnology 16% 
Administration 14% Finance 
industry 
14% 
Process mgmt. 10% Food industry 10% 
Marketing 9% Event mgmt. 6% 
Production 9% Legal 4% 
Research & 
development 
9% Insurances 4% 
Purchasing 5% Music industry 2% 














We were able to identify 300 situations of our 
interview partners in which they intended to behave 
non- compliantly according to the ISPs of their 
organization. We used their experience in these 
situations as objects and classified them with our 
conceptual-to-empirical derived taxonomy from the 
first iteration. 
During the analysis of the objects, we were able 
to identify new dimensions and characteristics. After 
165 objects were analyzed, we reached a certain level 
of maturity and could not derive any additional 
dimensions or characteristics from the analyzed 
objects. Therefore, we decided to stop the second 
iteration. In the third iteration, an empirical-to-
conceptual approach was chosen again to classify the 
remaining 135 objects using the taxonomy from the 
second iteration. No new dimensions or characteristics 
were identified during this analysis. After the third 
iteration, we additionally had to check whether the 
ending conditions defined at the beginning were 
fulfilled. We analyzed a representative number of 
objects for our analysis because we were able to show 
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that at least one object is assigned to each 
characteristic of each dimension, and after a certain 
number of assigned objects, no new dimensions or 
characteristics could be identified. No new dimensions 
and characteristics were added during the last 
iteration, and no new dimensions and characteristics 
were split or assigned during the last iteration. Each 
dimension and characteristic is unique and has not 
been repeated, meaning duplicates do not exist, and 
each cell of the taxonomy is unique and has not been 
repeated. We conducted an independent review of five 
information security research experts to test our 
subjective ending conditions. The experts confirmed 
the describability, robustness, extensibility, and 
completeness of the taxonomy [29]. 
4.2. A taxonomy for information security 
policy non-compliance behavior 
In total, our taxonomy consists of five dimensions 
and 16 characteristics which follows the suggestion of 
Nickerson et al. (2103) [11]. Table 2 shows our final 
taxonomy, including a description of the dimensions 
and characteristics. We further show whether the 
dimensions and characteristics were derived from 
existing literature or an outcome of our structured 
content analysis. 
 
Table 2. Final taxonomy for information security policy 
non-compliance behavior (C = conceptual, E = empirical). 
 




Personal moral beliefs describe the view 
that what an individual thinks is morally 
right or wrong and thus influences their 
intention and behavior. 
Organizational 
Moral (C) 
Organizational moral beliefs describe the 
view that what an employee thinks is 
morally right or wrong when acting as a 
representative of it’s organization and thus 
influences their intention and behavior. 
Awareness [5] (C) 
Conscious (C) The characteristic “conscious” describes 
the behavioral state in which an employee 
is aware of its non-compliant behavior 
regarding information security policies. 
Not Conscious 
(C) 
The characteristic “not conscious” 
describes the behavioral state in which an 
employee is not aware of its non-
compliant behavior regarding information 
security policies. 
Motive [20] (C) 
Beneficial (E) A motive is classified as “beneficial” 
when an employee with a violation of the 
ISP intends to effect something positive 
toward another person or their 
organization. 
Malicious (C) The motive is classified as “malicious” 
when it is apparent from an employee's 
behavior that they intend to harm another 




Motive is classified as “not malicious” 
when it is apparent from an employee's 
behavior that they do not intend to harm 
another person or their organization with 
an ISP security breach. 
Expected  Outcome (E) 
Informative (E) The expected outcome of a particular 
behavior is classified as “informative” if 
an employee hopes to gain informative 
value from non-compliant behavior. 
Monetary (E) The expected outcome of a particular 
behavior is classified as “monetary” if an 
employee hopes to get a monetary reward 
when not complying with ISP’s. 
Status (E) The characteristic “status” describes the 
expected outcome of non-compliance 
behavior, from which an employee hopes 
to improve their reputation. 
Amusement (E) The characteristic “amusement” refers to 
behavior in which an ISP threat is being 
performed to amuse the performer of the 
threat. 
Convenience (E) The expected outcome of a particular 
behavior is classified as “convenience” 
if an employee seeks to benefit, such as 
saving to or effort from non-complying 
with the ISP of their organization. 
None (E) If no specific outcome is expected 
through information security non-
compliance behavior, the behavior is 
classified with the characteristic “none.” 
Motivational Trigger [4, 18] (C) 
Extrinsic (social) 
(E) 
Extrinsic (social) motivational trigger 
refers to an external influence on an 
employee from its social environment, 




Extrinsic (forced) motivational trigger 
refers to an external influence on an 
employee, pushing pressure on them and 




The intrinsic (proactive) motivational 
triggers refer to behavior, which is only 
motivated by an employee’s motives 




The dimension “Moral Beliefs” was derived with 
its characteristics of personal and organizational 
morals considering empirical iteration from the 
concepts according to Vance et al. 2020 [21]. The 
results of our interviews show that information 
security non-compliance behavior can differ in terms 
of moral belief in personal or organizational morality 
[30]. Behaviors with personal morality often refer to 
situations in which employees acted from their 
perspective, e.g., to generate added value for 
themselves. Organizational morality can be seen in 
behaviors where employees commit a security breach 
to provide added value to the organization, such as 
finishing work outside working hours and using 
private hardware. 
The dimension “Awareness” with its 
characteristics was derived from existing literature [5]. 
The characteristic “Not Conscious” could be identified 
in behaviors where an employee did not immediately 
know when committing the violation that it was a 
violation of the ISP. However, the characteristic 
“Conscious” was used to classify behaviors in which 
the interviewees were aware, that their behavior 
violated their organization's ISP. 
The “Motive” can be divided into a total of three 
different characteristics, where malicious and non-
malicious refer to the constructs according to Guo et 
al. (2011), and the characteristic “Beneficial” is a 
result of the structured content analysis of the 
empirical-conceptual, second iteration and was 
derived from the objects we analyzed [20]. Types of 
behavior that provide added value to the organization 
were characterized as beneficial. An example of such 
behavior is, e.g., that an employee sent company 
information to the private e-mail address to complete 
work on private hardware and thought that they were 
doing something good for the organization. Malicious 
behavior can be classified as when employees actively 
intended to harm their target with their violation, such 
as using system privileges to steal information from 
other employees for their own added value. Non-
malicious behavior represents the opposite of 
malicious behavior, where an employee had no 
malicious intent in their behavior, such as browsing 
away work time. 
The “Expected outcome” is a dimension that we 
defined from the results of the structured content 
analysis during the second iteration. It consists of six 
different characteristics. The characteristic 
“Informative” was used to classify types of behavior 
in which the committing person obtained additional, 
needed information that he or she would not have 
obtained without the act. For example, one interview 
person used a system access to view team members' 
salaries and have a better bargaining point for the next 
salary negotiation. The expected outcome, 
“Monetary” was used to classify behaviors where the 
expected added value was for improving the financial 
situation of the committing person, such as stealing 
information for sale to third parties. Another expected 
added value is improving status, where employees 
expected their behavior to increase their reputation. 
The characteristic “Amusement” was used to classify 
behaviors that were done solely for the amusement of 
the perpetrators, such as changing the background 
images of other employees because they did not lock 
their PC screens and left the workplace for a short 
time. Other objects could be classified in this 
dimension by ”Convenience.” We were able to 
identify behaviors that have their added value in 
convenience or, for example, saving time. We were 
able to identify the characteristics of online shopping 
during working hours or the use of company hardware 
for private purposes, such as network printers. When 
employees reported types of behavior where no direct 
added value could be attributed to them, the 
characteristic “None” was used. An example of this is 
the use of digital company discounts for third parties. 
The dimension “Motivational trigger” is divided 
into three different characteristics. These are based on 
the constructs identified by Padayachee (2012) and 
Das et al. (2019) [4, 18]. We were able to assign to the 
social (extrinsic) characteristic types of behavior in 
which an individual reported that he or she chooses to 
violate information security policies for social reasons. 
For example, one individual reported that they 
obtained information in a non-compliant manner and 
disclosed it to the legal system to prevent socially non-
compliant organizational behavior (cheating). Under 
the characteristic forced (extrinsic), behaviors were 
classified in which employees were forced to behave 
in a certain way by external influences. For example, 
a person was forced by their manager to pass on 
unencrypted company information to others via 
unauthorized distribution channels. The third 
characteristic, intrinsic (proactive), was used to 
classify behaviors in which individuals committed an 
ISP offense out of their own motivation, such as using 
company software to avoid buying it themselves or 
saving time. Table 3 shows examples for classified 
objects to determine different types of ISP non-
















Using private hardware to 
finish work at home: 
 
“I once sent a corporate 
presentation to my private mail 
address to finish my work at 
home because there was no time 
to finish it in the office. I know 
that we are actually not allowed 
to do it, but I wanted to finish my 










Online shopping during work 
time: 
 
“Sometimes I do online shopping 
during work when I have not 
much to do. I know it is not 
allowed, but I think if I have the 
time to do it during work, I don’t 









Inviting external people to 
online company meetings: 
 
“It happened from time to time 
that colleagues asked me to invite 
people from outside of the 
organizations to participate in our 
corporate meeting, like a 
conference. I did not know that 
this was a security threat until 
someone told me.” 











“Once I used a software license 
key for private purposes. My 
organization did not control the 
license usages, so I just installed 
the software on my private device 
to save money”. 








Unauthorized installation of 
software: 
 
“I really had to finish work, but 
my organization was not able to 
provide me the software I needed. 
So I just bypassed the 
administration rights and installed 











information to not involved 
colleagues: 
 
“I have shared confidential 
information with other colleagues 
to alert them of problems in their 
organization, even though I was 










Using corporate hardware for 
private purposes: 
 
“I used my corporate laptop for 
private purposes because I did not 
know that it is forbidden. It 
helped me to save time because I 
did not have to switch the devices 
all the time.” 











By reviewing existing literature, conducting 
expert interviews, and structuring our findings in the 
form of a taxonomy using a method from Nickerson et 
al. (2013), we developed a taxonomy for types of ISP 
non-compliance behavior in this paper. It is an 
important milestone for structuring different behaviors 
regarding information security [11]. This paper makes 
several theoretical contributions. In the first place, it 
provides a comprehensive overview of how ISP non-
compliance behavior can be classified. This allows 
researchers to distinguish the different behaviors from 
each other and analyze what mechanisms positively 
influence the different types of behaviors. It makes it 
possible for researchers in the future to respond to 
different contextual differences, such as types of 
offenses and to understand the origin of these more 
precisely, and analyze them specifically. Also, our 
taxonomy provides characteristics for differentiating 
behaviors that allow us to design specific awareness 
measures for the different behaviors. Design science 
research in the security awareness domain can use our 
taxonomy as a basis for designing specific security 
measures. 
In addition to our theoretical contribution, we can 
furthermore present practical benefits of our work. 
Our taxonomy provides a keen overview for IT 
managers or IT security experts about the different 
aspects they have to consider when designing and 
using different information security measures. Based 
on our classification scheme, it is possible to derive 
measures for specific types of behavior, such as 
targeted awareness programs, based on behaviors 
where employees were not aware of their offenses or 
specific measures against the different types of 
expected added values. Further possibilities would be, 
e.g., the use of behavior with organizational moral or 
beneficial intention to achieve a positive effect on 
information security, e.g., promoting an information 
security culture [32]. 
Besides the presented results, this work also has 
some limitations. Our taxonomy is not based on data 
collected from a specific industry but rather provides 
a cross-sector view of the classification of types of ISP 
non-compliance behavior. Therefore, sector specifics 
could not be explicitly considered as in, e.g., strong 
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regulated sectors, such as the airspace or military 
industry. Additionally, it should be noted that 
taxonomies are based on the subjective assumptions of 
the researcher creating the taxonomy. Another 
researcher might, therefore, have different opinions 
about the classification of objects and the creation and 
modification of dimensions and characteristics. In 
addition, the sample size does not allow a meaningful 
differentiation between individual job positions in 
connection with the developed taxonomy. Moreover, 
a broader range of interviews might reveal other 
dimensions or characteristics useful for the taxonomy. 
For example, contextual differences such as different 
occupations or demographic dependencies could not 
be taken into account. This also applies to the different 
effects of the identified elements of our taxonomy on 
ISP non-compliance behavior. The dimensions and 
characteristics may depend on other factors that 
influence their mode of action but are too complex to 
be represented in a taxonomy. For example, it can be 
seen that moral beliefs or behavioral intention can be 
influenced by factors such as culture but could not be 
included in our taxonomy due to their complexity. 
Future studies based on our taxonomy must take these 
influencing factors into account. 
However, our results show potentials for further 
research on information security behavior with 
addressing the gap in existing research of a holistically 
and analytically as well as empirically developed 
taxonomy. Essentially, it becomes clear that the 
individual dimensions and characteristics of the 
taxonomy form sub-areas of ISP non-compliance 
behavior. In addition to that, a detailed investigation 
of the individual areas could be beneficial. This is 
especially thought-provoking since it could be shown 
at some points, e.g., the relation between behavior and 
a certain expected outcome of a security threat has 
been less considered in research so far. An analysis of 
applied theories and methods in the individual 
dimensions would be interesting for future studies to 
understand better which theoretical mechanisms work 
for specific behavior types. Based on recurring 
examples during the interviews, a closer examination 
of the different behaviors should be carried out, based 
on the taxonomy, as well as deriving suitable 
archetypes for ISP non-compliance behavior. Both 
approaches could offer deeper insights into ISP non-
compliance behavior patterns. Additionally, a more 
detailed investigation of the identified dimensions of 
our taxonomy can be carried out, considering further 
context-relevant aspects such as culture or 
demographic differences [31]. Furthermore, possible 
dependencies in our taxonomy must not be ignored. 
Thus, future research should analyze whether certain 
manifestations of the characteristics often occur 
together and whether archetypes of behavior can be 
derived from them. 
6. Conclusion  
Information security compliance behavior is a 
growing topic in IS research and practice. It is 
becoming increasingly important for companies to 
understand the causes of non-compliance behavior and 
derive appropriate countermeasures correctly. Based 
on our identified dimensions and characteristics of our 
taxonomy, information security researchers can 
identify different types of ISP non-compliant behavior 
for their research and analyze specific types of 
behavior more closely. Information security 
practitioners can use our taxonomy to better 
distinguish the different reasons for a security threat 
and develop measures that effectively address the 
actual reason and not just non-compliant behavior. 
Furthermore, the taxonomy provides a holistic 
overview of the different descriptive elements of types 
of ISP non-compliance behavior and is a theoretical 
basis for future research, e.g., by defining archetypes 
for each dimension of the taxonomy or by considering 
already applied theories in the different types of 
behavior. Future studies can consider our results for a 
more specific analysis of the individual elements of 
describing the different types of behavior.  
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